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Abstract
This Note suggests limiting the use of international agreements which are not treaties. To ac-
complish this, it determines the proper limits of executive agreements and establishes a procedure
by which courts should analyze their constitutional validity.
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
WEINBERGER V. ROSSI: UNDERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY-MAKING POWER
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in Weinberger v. Rossi,1 recently faced
the question whether the word treaty in an act of Congress includes
executive agreements. 2 In the absence of legislative intent, the
Court construed the term treaty to encompass executive agree-
ments .
3
The United States Constitution expressly mandates that trea-
ties are to be made with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate.4 An executive agreement is not submitted for Senate ap-
proval, but rather is negotiated by the President on the basis of his
own constitutional authority 5 or pursuant to specific congressional
authorization.6 By equating these two distinct international instru-
ments, the Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on a type of
compact which is not made pursuant to the Constitution's treaty-
making provisions.
Equating executive agreements with treaties raises several con-
stitutional issues. The Rossi decision disturbs both the established
separation of powers doctrine and the constitutional authority to
conduct foreign relations. 7 Because of these adverse domestic effects
of attributing to the executive agreement the exalted status of the
treaty, it is necessary to limit the use of international agreements
which are not treaties. 8 To accomplish this, it is essential to deter-
mine the proper limits of executive agreements and to establish a
procedure by which courts should analyze their constitutional va-
lidity.
1. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
2. Id. at 26.
3. Id. at 36.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
6. See in.fra text accompanying notes 54-55.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 76-90.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 109-24.
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I. WEINBERGER V. ROSSI
A. Background of the Decision
In 1968, the President negotiated with the Republic of the
Philippines a Base Labor Agreement" (BLA) providing for the pref-
erential hiring of local nationals at United States military facilities
in the Philippines.' 0 The agreement was not submitted for the
advice and consent of the Senate." Rather, it was concluded pursu-
ant to a 1944 act of Congress 12 authorizing the President to use
"such means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and
to retain such bases . . . and the rights incident thereto . . . for the
mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United
States." 13
Three years after the conclusion of the BLA, 14 Congress en-
acted section 106 of the Military Selective Service Act ' 5 (the Act),
which bars employment discrimination against American citizens
or their dependents on United States overseas military bases unless
permitted by "treaty."'"
9. Agreement Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States
Military Bases in the Philippines, May 27, 1968, United States-Philippines, 19 U.S.T. 5892,
T.I.A.S. No. 6542 [hereinafter cited as BLA].
10. Id. at 5892-93, T.I.A.S. No. 6542, at 1-2. Article I of the BLA provides:
1. Preferential Employment-The United States Armed Forces in the Philippines
shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens except when
the needed skills are found, in consultation with the Philippine Department of Labor,
not to be locally available, or when otherwise necessary for reasons of security or
special management needs, in which cases United States nationals may be employed.
Id.
11. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
12. Acquisition of Military and Naval Bases by United States, 22 U.S.C. § 1392 (1976).
13. Id.
14. BLA, supra note 9.
15. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-129, §106, 85 Stat. 348, 355
(1971) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7201 note (1976)). At the time Congress enacted § 106 of the
Military Selective Service Act, there were 12 other executive agreements in force providing for
the preferential hiring of local nationals on United States overseas military bases. Rossi, 456 U.S.
at 32. Since the enactment of § 106, four more such agreements have been concluded. Id.
16. Section 106 provides in pertinent part:
Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the Depart-
ment of Defense or by any officer or employee thereof, in the employment of
civilian personnel at any facility or installation operated by the Department of
Defense in any foreign country because such person is a citizen of the United States
or is a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 106, 85 Stat. 348, 355 (1971).
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In 1978, American game room managers at the United States
Naval Station at Subic Bay were discharged from their positions in
accordance with the BLA so that their jobs could be filled by
Filipino nationals.' 7 Subsequently, they brought suit 18 against the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy, charging dis-
crimination on the basis of citizenship under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,19 and alleging a violation of section 106 of the
Act. 20
The issue confronting the courts was whether Congress in-
tended the "treaty" exemption in section 106 to include executive
agreements such as the BLA, or whether it intended to limit the
exemption to article II treaties. 2 l The district court held that the
word "treaty" in section 106 means "any binding agreement be-
tween the governments of two nations. ' 22 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the term
"treaty" was used "in the sense set forth in article II of the Constitu-
tion."' 23 The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals,
upholding the validity of the BLA as within the treaty exemption
provision of section 106.24
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis in Rossi
Justice Rehnquist stated that the question presented in Rossi
was one of statutory construction.2 5 He began by examining the
language of the statute,26 and indicated that the word "treaty" has
17. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 28.
18. Rossi v. Brown, 467 F. Supp. 960 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 642 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir.
1980), rev'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The district court, holding that the term "treaty" in § 106
should be construed to include executive agreements such as the BLA, determined that "[tlhe
specific provision that the Department of Defense may discriminate on the basis of citizenship
if provided by treaty therefore controls over the general provisions of Title VII." Rossi, 467 F.
Supp. at 968. The question of a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), was not addressed by the court of appeals, Rossi, 642 F.2d at 561
n.36, nor raised in the petition for certiorari. Thus, the Supreme Court did not consider the
issue. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 36 n.18.
20. Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 106, 85 Stat. 348, 355 (1971).
21. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 26, rev'g Rossi v. Brown, 642 F.2d at 553 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), rev'g 467 F. Supp. at 961 (D.D.C. 1979).
22. Rossi, 467 F. Supp. at 961.
23. Rossi, 642 F.2d at 555.
24. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 36.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id. at 28-29.
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more than one meaning.2 7 He noted that international law does not
distinguish between agreements designated as "treaties" and other
international agreements.2
8
The Court also stated that numerous federal statutes reflect
congressional inconsistency in distinguishing between article II
treaties and other international agreements. 2 The Court then re-
viewed the legislative history of the Act. 30 It found that the confer-
ence reports 3I and congressional debates 32 are "entirely silent as to
the scope of the 'treaty' exception." 33 Furthermore, the reports
failed to mention twelve other presidential agreements that provide
for preferential hiring of local nationals. 34 In scrutinizing the con-
gressional purpose of section 106, the Supreme Court determined
that "Congress was principally concerned with the financial hard-
ship to American servicemen which resulted from discrimination
against American citizens at overseas bases."' 35 The Court stated
that "no support whatsoever" was provided for the proposition that
"Congress was ...concerned with limiting the authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements with the host coun-
try." 36
The Supreme Court also relied heavily on the case of B. Alt-
man & Co. v. United States.37 In Altman, decided seventy years
27. Id. at 29-30.
28. Id. at 29. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 71 introductory note 3, at 73 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
DRAFr RESTATEMENT].
29. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 30. The Court observed that Congress has explicitly mentioned
article II treaties in the Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23)
(1976), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1976). Rossi, 456
U.S. at 30. However, Congress has used the term "treaty" to refer to international agreements
other than article II treaties in the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1976),
wherein Congress authorized the Postal Service, with the consent of the President, to "negoti-
ate and conclude postal treaties or conventions." Id., quoted in Rossi, 456 U.S. at 31.
30. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 32-35.
31. Extension and Revision of the Draft Act and Related Laws, H.R. REP. No. 433, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1971).
32. 117 CONG. REc. 14,389 (1971).
33. 456 U.S. at 33.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 32-33.
36. Id. at 33. The court of appeals, reviewing the identical house reports, concluded
that exercising a check on the President's power to negotiate and conclude agreements
discriminating against Americans was precisely the intent of Congress. 642 F.2d at 560 n.30.
37. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
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earlier, the Supreme Court held that the term "treaty" in section 5
of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,38 included interna-
tional agreements made by the President pursuant to congressional
authorization.
39
Justice Rehnquist explained that the statute in Altman "in no
way affected the foreign policy of the United States."' 40 He there-
fore concluded that "[i]n the case of a statute such as § 106, that
does touch upon the United States' foreign policy, there is even
more reason to construe Congress' use of 'treaty' to include interna-
tional agreements as well as Art. II treaties. ' 41 Accordingly, the
BLA and twelve other discriminatory military base pacts were
upheld by the Supreme Court. 42
C. Interpretation of the Decision
Justice Rehnquist stated the issue narrowly as one of statutory
construction, 43 holding that for the purpose of section 106 of the
Act, the word "treaty" was intended to include executive agree-
ments such as the BLA. 44 However, the case may have broader
implications. It is arguable that the Rossi decision raises executive
agreements to the status of article II treaties, which are approved
by two-thirds of the Senate.
As the Supreme Court relied on Altman for the proposition
that a congressional-executive agreement may be accorded the same
status as an article II treaty, 45 future courts may use Rossi to sup-
38. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827-28 (1891).
39. Altman, 224 U.S. at 601. Referring to a commercial reciprocity agreement entered
into with France under the Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151, the Court stated that: "If
not technically a treaty requiring ratification, nevertheless it was a compact authorized by
the Congress of the United States, negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its
President. We think such a compact is a treaty under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act ....
Altman, 224 U.S. at 601.
40. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 31.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 35-36.
43. Id. at 26. Justice Rehnquist stated:
The question in this case is whether "treaty" includes executive agreements con-
cluded by the President with the host country, or whether the term is limited to
those international agreements entered into by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate pursuant to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitu-
tion. This issue is solely one of statutory interpretation.
Id.
44. Id. at 36.
45. Id. at 31.
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port the same proposition. Furthermore, numerous federal statutes
exist which, like section 106, contain the nebulous term "treaty,"
yet have no legislative history specifying the proper scope of the
word. 46 Thus, future courts construing the term "treaty" in a fed-
eral statute in which legislative intent is lacking, will be faced with
the Supreme Court's presumption in Rossi that "some affirmative
expression of congressional intent . . . is required in order to con-
strue the word 'treaty' in § 106 as meaning only Art. II treaties. ' 47
This general presumption raises broad constitutional issues, which
are especially significant in relation to the President's constitutional
authority to conduct foreign relations. 48
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF TREATIES AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
The Constitution gives the President the power to make trea-
ties, but only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senators present. 49 Thus, while the authority to make treaties is
listed in article II, which concerns the executive power, 50 the
46. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 955(a) (Supp. III 1979) ("When a treaty is in effect between
the United States and a foreign country providing for the transfer of convicted offenders, the
Secretary concerned may, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, transfer to said
foreign country any offender against chapter 47 of this title. Said transfer shall be effected
subject to the terms of such treaty and chapter 306 of title 18, United States Code."); The
Armed Forces Act, 10 U.S.C. § 7344 (1976) ("In case of a treaty for the limitation of naval
armament to which the United States is a signatory, the President may suspend so much of
the authorized naval construction as is necessary to bring the naval aircraft of the United
States within the limitations agreed upon. Such a suspension does not apply to aircraft under
construction at the time the suspension is made."); Other Applicable Rules of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7852(d) (1976): ("No provision of this title shall apply in any case
where its application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States in effect
on the date of enactment of this title."). Whether the word treaty is meant to include
executive agreements in these Acts is left unresolved. See also Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 104
(1976); Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (1976); Shipping, 46 U.S.C. §
135 (1976).
Executive agreements far surpass treaties in number. Since the mid 1950's, the United
States has entered into approximately 200 executive agreements each year while only entering
into approximately 15 article II treaties in the same period. See Rovine, Separation of Powers
and International Relations, 52 IND. L. J. 397, 406-07 (1977).
47. 456 U.S. at 32.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 49-75.
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
50. Id.
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treaty-making process may be best described as a function of a
"Fourth Branch of government," the President-and-Senate (in its
executive capacity) .51
Although the Constitution mandates that the treaty-making
power should be shared, it "does not expressly confer authority on
any branch of government to make international agreements other
than treaties." 5 2 However, courts have recognized on many occa-
sions that executive agreements are valid and enforceable tools of
foreign policy. 53
The term "executive agreement" includes three categories of
international agreements negotiated by the President: (1) agree-
ments issued without submission to Congress (solely presidential
executive agreements); (2) agreements that supplement existing
treaties; and (3) agreements negotiated by the President pursuant to
specific congressional authority 54 or issued after approval by joint
resolution of Congress requiring simple majorities in both houses
(congressional-executive agreements). 55
Because treaties are the only international agreements de-
scribed in the Constitution, the constitutional sources of authority
for the President and Congress to conclude executive agreements
remains subject to debate .5  As to the solely presidential executive
51. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 148 (1972). Alexander
Hamilton explained:
The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong,
properly neither to the legislative nor to the executive. The qualities elsewhere
detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the
Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast importance of
the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation
of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 466-67 (A. Hamilton) (H. Cabot Lodge ed. 1888), quoted in L.
HENKJN, supra, at 148.
52. L. HENKIN, supra note 51, at 173.
53. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912). For a discussion of these
cases, see supra text accompanying notes 37-39; infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
54. The BLA is an example of a congressional-executive agreement of the type negoti-
ated by the President pursuant to specific congressional statutory authority. See supra text
accompanying notes 9-13.
55. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 188 (1978); Catudal,
Executive Agreements: A Supplement to the Treaty-Making Procedure, 10 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 653, 656-63 (1942); McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presi-
dential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy:1, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
204-05 (1945).
56. The issue of the constitutionality of executive agreements was zealously debated by
constitutional scholars in the 1940's. See, e.g., Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement
Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 '(1944); Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agree-
1983] EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
agreement, it has been asserted that the President has broad inher-
ent power to conduct foreign affairs. 57 This view, however, has
been widely criticized. 58 The more modern view is that presidential
authority to enter into international arrangements is derived from
ments-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945); McDougal & Lans, supra note 55, at 216-26. More
recently, the question of identifying the consititutional basis for executive agreements has
been addressed in hearings of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Congressional Over-
sight of Executive Agreements on S. 1286 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers on
the judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1874) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings], and before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Con-
gress: Hearings on S. 591 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). In Connection with the passage of the Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1979) (requiring the
text of any executive agreement to be transmitted to Congress within 60 days of entering into
force) and the hearings on the Ervin bill, S. 1286, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (authorizing a
congressional veto power over executive agreements), the Senate debated the proper foreign
policy role of the House in the exercise of its legislative powers under the Constitution and the
extent of vested independent presidential power under the Constitution.
57. For example, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936),
Justice Sutherland stated that although the President is not specifically delegated constitu-
tional power to conclude international agreements other than treaties, this power "neverthe-
less exist[s] as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality." Id. at 318. In New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), Justice Stewart stated that "[iun the
governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Executive is endowed with enor-
mous power in the two related areas of national defense and international relations." Id. at
727 (Stewart, J., concurring).
58. The "inherent powers" view has been criticized in dicta by a later case, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 604 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). For
further criticism of Justice Sutherland's analysis in Curtiss-Wright, see Levitan, The Foreign
Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 490
(1946); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassess-
ment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973). See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), in
which the Supreme Court upheld a presidential order attaching Iranian assets in the United
States and suspending the claims of American citizens against the Iranian government. Id. at
668. While upholding this exercise of executive power, the Court made it clear that the
President's attachment order was issued pursuant to congressional authorization under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. III 1979). Dames
& Moore, 453 U.S. at 662. As to the suspension of claims of American citizens, the Court
declined to address the issue of broad presidential authority, stating:
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as
against foreign governmental entities . . . . But when, as here, the settlement of
claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute . . . and when as here, we can conclude that Congress
acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President
lacks the power to settle such claims.
Id. at 688. Justice Rehnquist did, however, indicate an unwillingness to accept the Curtiss-
Wright broad plenary powers approach to foreign affairs, asserting that there are "checks
and balances" on such presidential power implicit in the Constitution. Id. at 662. For a
general discussion of the Dames & Moore v. Regan decision, see Note, Presidential Power and
the Iranian Hostage Agreement; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 62 B.Y.U. L. REv. 161 (1982);
Comment, Iranian Assets and Claims Settlement Agreements: A Study of Presidential For-
eign Relations Power, 56 TUL. L. REv. 1364 (1982).
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the President's limited article II powers as Commander-in-Chief 9
and diplomatic officer. 0 The President does not have the authority
to conclude agreements outside the scope of this limited constitu-
tional prescription.61
There is also no consensus as to the constitutional support for
congressional-executive agreements. 62 It has been suggested that
Congress can combine its legislative powers6 3 with the President's
authority to negotiate with foreign governments.6 4 Some scholars
have urged that even if neither the President nor Congress alone has
the authority to enter into international agreements, together they
embody the national sovereignty in foreign affairs, and therefore
may exercise all powers inherent in such sovereignty.6 5 Thus, "the
powers of the Congress can be superadded to those of the President,
and the two sets of powers taken together are plenary." 6 Any type
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States .. " Id.
60. Id. art. II, § 3. "[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers ...... Id. For a general discussion of the specific limited constitu-
tional authority of the President, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8865, reprinted in DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296-97 (1975); W. BISHOP, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 102 (3d ed. 1971): E. CORWIN, THE CONSITITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 484 (1964); Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign
Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5, 55 (1972); Rovine, Separation of Powers and International
Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397, 399, 412-13 (1977).
61. W. BISHOP, supra note 60; E. CORWIN, supra note 60; Berger, supra note 60, at 43-
44; Rovine, supra note 60, at 412-16.
62. See supra note 56.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For example, Congress has the power to collect taxes and
import duties, to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, to
borrow money on the credit of the United States, to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy
throughout the United States, to coin money and regulate its value, to establish post offices
and post roads, to promote the progress of science and useful arts, to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations, to
declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on
land and water, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to make rules
for the government and to regulate land and naval forces, to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for executing the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Id. Furthermore, Congress "shall have power to dispose of and to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." Id. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2.
64. See DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 307 & comment a. See also Comment,
Approval of SALT Agreements by Joint Resolution of Congress, 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 421, 439
(1980).
65. See DRAFI RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 307 reporters' note 1; MeDougal & Lans,
supra note 55, at 238-61.
66. McDougal & Lans, supra note 55, at 246.
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of congressional-executive agreement would therefore have a valid
constitutional basis. Taking this approach to its logical conclusion,
executive agreements are interchangeable with treaties. The Re-
statement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States 7 (Draft Restatement) is in accord with this view. 68
Another possible constitutional basis for the congressional-ex-
ecutive agreement is said to be the "necessary and proper" clause of
the Constitution. 9 A third proposal suggests that "if the subject
matter to be regulated falls within the constitutional powers of
Congress, the latter may constitutionally authorize the President to
deal with it by negotiation and agreement with other governments,
the treaty-making power to the contrary not withstanding. '7 0 Ex-
amples of Congress' enumerated powers include the power to regu-
late foreign trade, to provide for the protection of rights in useful
inventions, to make rules governing captures on land and water, to
establish a uniform rule for naturalization, to establish post offices
and post roads, to raise and support armies, and to provide and
67. D Fr RESTATEMENT, supra note 28.
68. Id. § 307 comment b.
69. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8; see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 55, at
177; Ohly, Advice and Consent: International Executive Claims Settlement Agreements, 5
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 271, 273-75 (1975); Note, Executive Agreements, The Treaty-Making
Clause, and Strict Constructionism, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 587, 612 (1975). It is argued that
under the "necessary and proper" clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Congress could constitu-
tionally enact legislation authorizing the President to make certain agreements, thus fulfilling
its duty to see that the powers of the other branches of government are carried into execution.
Note, supra, at 612. It is also proposed that:
The "necessary and proper" clause authorizes Congress to pass legislation to effectu-
ate any of its delegated powers under the Constitution. Because Congress can effect
the same domestic results by legislation as it can by authorizing a non-treaty
agreement, the power to enact legislation suggests that Congress has the power to
authorize non-treaty agreements.
Comment, supra note 64, at 440.
70. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS 215 (4th rev. ed. 1957); see
Levitan, Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 35 ILL. L. REv. 365, 394-95 (1940); Wright, The United
States and International Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 345 (1944). See also 1974
Hearings, supra note 56, at 5, in which the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers expressed
the view that
any reading of the Constitution reveals an intent that Congress should exercise
substantial power over the Nation's external affairs; for example, article I, section 8,
grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to declare
war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy, all powers
inextricably linked with the Nation's external relations.
1983]
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maintain a navy.71 Congress also has power to dispose of territory
or property belonging to the United States. 72 If acting pursuant to
these constitutional powers, Congress can issue directives authoriz-
ing the President to negotiate international agreements.
The Rossi decision, without analyzing the constitutional valid-
ity of congressional-executive agreements such as the BLA, could be
interpreted to create a presumption that "treaties" and congres-
sional-executive agreements are synonymous within the meaning of
a federal statute in the absence of clear congressional intent to the
contrary. 73 This presumption contradicts both the treaty-making
74
scheme envisioned in the Constitution and the separation of powers
among the branches of the federal government.
75
III. DOMESTIC RAMIFICATIONS
A. Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
The separation of powers doctrine is one of the most important
principles of the American constitutional system .76 Inherent in the
doctrine is the idea that each branch of government should defend
its constitutional functions from intrusion by either of the other
branches. 77 Substituting congressional-executive agreements for ar-
ticle II treaties violates this established principle. 78
The Constitution nowhere authorizes the combined houses of
Congress to participate in making any international compact; it
provides only for Senate prerogative in this area. 79 Congress' lim-
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See supra note 62.
72. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
73. See supra text accompanying note 47.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 76-81. See also 1974 Hearings, supra note 56, at
3-5. Recognizing that other types of international agreements exist, the subcommittee on
separation of powers is "firmly of the opinion that policymaking in foreign affairs was never
intended to be concentrated in one branch of Government. It is a shared power, subject, as
are other constitutional powers, to the 'checks and balances'-that is, the principal of
separation of powers-implicit in the Constitution." Id.
76. E. CORWIN, supra note 70, at 9.
77. Id.
78. If the congressional-executive agreement is to be substituted for an article II treaty,
the Senate's characteristic function as the sole treaty-making participant will be intruded
upon by the House of Representatives. Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A
Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 625 (1945).
79. L. HENKIN, supra note 51, at 164.
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ited constitutional authorization to legislate in the areas of foreign
commerce, tariffs, and the mails8° cannot support the proposition
that Congress has the power to authorize the executive to make any
agreement in any area of United States foreign relations.
81
Another alarming domestic implication of Rossi is that the use
of the congressional-executive agreement necessarily abrogates
many of the "checks and balances" inherent in the treaty-making
process.8 2 For example, if an executive agreement were entered into
pursuant to a vague directive allowing for broad presidential au-
thority,8 3 specific provisions of such authorized executive agree-
ments would not have to be approved by the legislature. Further-
more, congressional-executive "treaties" based on vaguely
formulated delegations diminish the Senate's ability to ensure that
"treaties" are of a type acceptable to the voters. 84 Each provision of
an article II treaty, however, is approved by the Senate.
8 5 The
Senate frequently has imposed conditions which modify United
States international obligations; 86 at other times, the Senate has
80. See supra note 63.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
82. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 171 (1978). "That the power to
conclude executive agreements coincides perfectly with the treaty power seems untenable,
since such a conclusion would emasculate the Senatorial check on executive discretion that
the Framers so carefully embodied in the Constitution." Id. See also 1974 Hearings, supra
note 56, at 5:
It is important to note that Congress is deeply involved only in treaties. Congres-
sional-executive international agreements, which of course involve legislative
action, may be analogized to the vague and nebulous delegations of power to
administrative agencies. Power to conclude this middle type of agreement is ulti-
mately derived from or dependent on Congress (either by statute or treaty), but, as
with so many of the delegations of power to the agencies of public administrations,
the Executive is usually left with wide discretion within hazy and uncertain limits.
Id.
83. The BLA was negotiated pursuant to such a broad, vague congressional directive.
See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. It is arguable that in enacting § 106, Congress
meant to "withdraw a portion of that broad power which it granted to the President in the
Act of 1944." Rossi, 642 F.2d at 556 n.30.
84. It has been suggested that agreements, like treaties, should be subject to the "salu-
tary influence of public opinion," and that "the country should not be bound by the
stipulations of executive agreements without its knowledge and without opportunity to
protest." I. MATTHEWS, AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: CONDUCT AND POLICIES 545-46
(1938).
85. L. WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 63 (1971).
86. For example, the United States Senate, on June 21, 1976, passed a resolution of
advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the
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exercised control over the treaties' impact on the United States.17
The requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote provides an im-
portant "check" upon an ambitious President88 since it is unlikely
that a President's party will consistently control over two-thirds of
the Senate. However, if a President were of the same party as the
majority in both houses, the congressional-executive agreement,
which makes bare majorities adequate,8 would not operate as an
effective "brake" on the autonomy of the presidential treaty-mak-
ing power.90
B. Impact on Domestic Law of Spreading Use of
Executive Agreements
The effect of treaties on domestic law is well established.
Under the Constitution, treaties as well as acts of Congress are the
United States and Spain, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Jan. 24, 1976, United States-
Spain, 27 U.S.T. 3005, T.I.A.S. No. 8360, providing for an explicit understanding that the
treaty "does not expand the existing United States defense commitments in the North Atlantic
Treaty Area or create a mutual defense commitment between the United States and Spain."
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 8908, reprinted in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 214-15 (1976). The resolution also provided that Senate advice and
consent to ratification should be understood to apply only to the initial five year period of the
treaty and that an extension shall require the further advice and consent of the Senate. Id.
87. The Senate's reservation to the Commercial Convention with Cuba, Dec. 11, 1902,
United States-Cuba, ch. 1, 33 Stat. 2136, 2143 (1903), required that the Convention should
not take effect in the United States until approved by Congress. Some Senate reservations to
the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 188-406, were designed to insure
Congress a major role in the implementation of the treaty in the United States. See Wright,
Validity of the Proposed Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 125-28,
140-42 (1920). The Senate has also provided that nothing in a treaty shall enhance the
President's powers or detract from or add to the powers of Congress. For example, the Senate
consented to ratification of the Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888 U.N.T.S.
179, on condition that:
[N]othing in the convention, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratifica-
tion thereof, confers any power on the Executive to bind the United States in
substantive matters beyond what the Executive now has, or to bind the United
States without compliance with applicable procedures imposed by domestic law, or
confers any power on the Congress to take action in fields previously beyond the
authority of Congress, or limits Congress in the exercise of any power it now has.
Id.
88. Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 660
(1945).
89. Id.
90. J. HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 78 (1975).
1983] EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
supreme law of the land.9 Therefore, a treaty may supersede an act
of Congress and state laws.92 The domestic effect of an executive
agreement is not as certain. 3 However, there has been a trend
toward imputing to executive agreements the same force of law
which attaches to treaties.
9 4
In United States v. Belmont9 5 and United States v. Pink,96 the
Supreme Court expressed its view that a state law must give way
when inconsistent with the provisions of an executive agreement.
9 7
91. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2,
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
92. In Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), the Supreme Court declared that:
By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the
supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.
When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the
language of either; but, if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control
the other ....
Id. at 194. A later treaty was given effect in the face of an earlier inconsistent statute in
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). In Schooner Peggy, an armed
ship, the property of citizens of the French Republic, was arrested off the United States coast
and would have been condemned pursuant to an act of Congress. Id. at 103-04. However,
the ship was protected under the terms of the Amity, Commerce and Friendship Treaty
between the United States and France, Amity, Commerce and Friendship Treaty, Feb. 6,
1778, United States-France, ch. 67, 8 Stat. 12, which was entered into subsequent to
congressional enactment and, therefore, the treaty provision directing restoration prevailed.
Id. at 103, 108-09. In Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), a self-executing treaty,
enacted subsequent to a congressional act, had the effect of superseding the act, so far as
inconsistent with the act.
Id. at 118-19.
93. Note, Executive Agreements and the Intent Behind the Treaty Power, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 757, 760 (1975).
94. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
95. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
96. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
97. Id. at 230-31; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331. Both decisions involved an executive
agreement with the Soviet Union, the Litvinoff-Roosevelt Debt Assignment of 1933, re-
printed in II Foreign Relations of the United States 804 (1933). In Pink, the Court stated: "A
treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) of the Constitution.
Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar
dignity." 315 U.S. at 230-31.
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The effect of an executive agreement on federal legislation, how-
ever, is uncertain. Only the Altman and Rossi decisions are on
point.9 8 The Draft Restatement" takes the position that "[t]he
United States may conclude international agreements other than
treaties, and such agreements may have the status of law in the
United States. If so, they supersede inconsistent prior federal
law."100 The Draft Restatement distinguishes between different
classes of executive agreements and their proper domestic effects.
According to the drafters:
An executive agreement pursuant to a treaty draws its authority
from that treaty and has the same effect as the treaty to super-
sede federal statutes or state law or an earlier inconsistent agree-
ment. If Congress, by joint resolution, authorizes the President
to conclude an international agreement, or approves such an
agreement, Congress may thereby also authorize superseding
any prior inconsistent federal legislation (or international agree-
ment) . . . although authorization to make executive agreements
superseding federal law should not be inferred lightly.101
The Draft Restatement notes that the impact of an executive
agreement made solely under the President's constitutional author-
ity on an earlier federal statute has not been established. 10 2 In
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. ,103 however, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a presidential executive
agreement, unlike a treaty, could not prevail over an earlier act of
Congress.10 4
98. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982); Altman, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
99. DaAvr RESTATEMENT, supra note 28.
100. Id. at 135 comment a.
101. Id.
102. id.
103. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953) (executive agreement between the United States and
Canada concerning exportation permits for seed potatoes held not authorized by Congress
and a contravention of provisions of statute dealing with same subject matter), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
104. Capps, 204 F.2d at 659-60. The court of appeals found that the executive agree-
ment infringed on Congress' power to regulate commerce. Id. at 658. The Supreme Court
affirmed on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove the underlying breach of
contract claim, but refused to rule on the actual validity of the executive agreement. Capps,
348 U.S. at 297. Another instance where an executive agreement will be struck down is when
it impinges on rights granted by the Constitution. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19
(1957) (executive agreement to subject overseas civilian dependents of United States armed
forces personnel to military court martials held to violate constitutional right to due process
and jury trial).
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The Altman and Rossi decisions are in accord with the Draft
Restatement.105 By holding in both cases that the term "treaty"
includes executive agreements,106 the Supreme Court allows agree-
ments inconsistent with federal legislation to become the "law of
the land." Thus, an agreement which was not ratified by two-thirds
of the Senate will be able to supersede a congressional act and state
law.
This result is alarming because congressionally unapproved,
and possibly unpopular, provisions of international agreements in
nontreaty form are now becoming a third source of domestic law
having no basis in the Constitution. This third source of law may
reappear in the future because numerous federal laws exist contain-
ing the term "treaty" in which Congress has neglected to define the
scope of the word. 107 Many occasions may arise, therefore, when an
executive agreement will override other United States laws under
the Rossi decision.
Invalidating all executive agreements is highly undesirable be-
cause executive agreements are binding on the United States as
international obligations regardless of whether they are upheld as
domestic law. 108 However, in light of their potentially adverse do-
mestic ramifications, there is a need to limit the scope of executive
agreements.
IV. THE SUGGESTED LIMITS FOR EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS
Courts may effectively restrict the scope of congressional-exec-
utive agreements by inquiring whether they were concluded pursu-
ant to proper constitutional authority. 09 In accordance with the
intent of the Framers, the use of the congressional-executive agree-
105. DRAnr RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 135(1). According to the Draft Restatement,
"a provision of an [international] agreement that becomes effective as law in the United
States supersedes any inconsistent . . . preexisting provision in the law of the United States."
Id. According to Rossi, the BLA, even though it was logically inconsistent with § 106,
superseded it. See Rossi, 456 U.S. at 32. In Altman the commercial reciprocity agreement
prevailed over the inconsistent § 5 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. See Altman, 224 U.S.
at 600-01.
106. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 36; Altman, 224 U.S. at 601.
107. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 31.
108. DaM-r RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 135(3). "The superseding of a rule of
international law or provision of international agreement as domestic law of the United
States by a subsequent act of Congress does not relieve the United States of its international
obligation or of the consequences of violation." Id.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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ment should be limited to matters which fall within the enumerated
powers of Congress. 10 Solely presidential agreements within the
President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief" 1 or dip-
lomatic officer 112 should also be upheld. " 3
The theory that Congress and the President together can super-
add their powers to form a valid constitutional basis for all congres-
sional-executive agreements is without constitutional support 14 be-
cause the Constitution does not delegate to Congress the authority
to conclude international agreements." 5 However, a constitution-
ally valid congressional-executive agreement may span the same
subject matter as a treaty." 6 In light of this inevitable overlap, two
options exist. Either, Congress and the President may, at their
discretion, conduct foreign relations through a constitutionally
valid congressional-executive agreement or a treaty, or they may
use a congressional-executive agreement if limited to those matters
which should be the proper focus of a nontreaty instrument.
Congress and the President should not have unfettered discre-
tion in choosing whether to employ executive agreements or trea-
ties." 7 The treaty-making power is explicitly granted in the consti-
tution while the constitutionality of executive agreements can at
best only be inferred." 8 Furthermore, treaties have an exalted place
in domestic law." 9 Therefore, criteria must be established to fur-
ther limit the scope of constitutional nontreaty agreements.
The "importance standard" limits executive agreements to
matters which are informal in nature, of mere administrative char-
110. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
112 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. Unlike the Altman decision, in
which the Court upheld the constitutional validity of the reciprocal trade agreement, 224
U.S. at 598, the Rossi Court neglected to inquire into the constitutional basis for the BLA.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
115. See id.
116. L. WILDHABER, supra note 85, at 117.
117. According to the Draft Restatement, the judgment as to the form of instrument to
be employed is a political one. DR-r RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 307 comment b.
However, in accordance with constitutional doctrine, Congress can only delegate to the
President those powers which it is constitutionally authorized to legislate domestically. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 82, §§ 5-17, at 285.
118. See supra text accompanying note 52.
119. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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acter, routine, unimportant, or previously authorized by Con-
gress.120 The "durability standard" requires that agreements "em-
bracing continuous executory obligations" and "permanent
transactions" be treaties, while agreements of "temporary interest"
may be concluded in nontreaty form.1 21 Although these standards
in the abstract may appear to be easily applied, they raise acute
problems of definitional vagueness and subjectivity.
The Department of State has issued guidelines for delineating
the proper scope of executive agreements and treaties. 122 The crite-
ria to examine are:
a) The extent to which the agreement involves commit-
ments or risks affecting the Nation as a whole;
b) Whether the agreement is intended to affect State laws;
120. Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664,
670 (1944). In developing the criteria for the "importance" test, Borchard relied on the
theories of Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss writer and jurist, who distinguished forms of
international agreements as follows:
A treaty. . . [is] a pact entered into by sovereigns for the welfare of the State, either in
perpetuity or for a considerable length of time . . . . Pacts which have for their object
matters of temporary interest are called agreements, conventions, compacts. They
are fulfilled by a single act and not by a continious performance of acts. When the
act in question is performed these pacts are executed once for all; whereas treaties
are executory in character and the acts called for must continue as long as the treaty
exists.
Id. at 668 (quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW (Fenwick trans. 1758)). Proponents of the "importance" test argue that the compact
clause of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 10, cl. 3, permitting states to "enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power" with the consent of
Congress but forbidding states to "enter into any Treaty," id. cl. 1, relegates all international
agreements not designated as treaties to subjects of minor importance. See Note, supra note
93, at 761-62. The Treaty Powers Resolution, S. 536, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC.
28,545 (1978), shows that some Senators advocate an "importance" test. The resolution
provides that "any international agreement which involves a significant political, military, or
economic commitment to a foreign country" constitutes a treaty and should be submitted to
the Senate for its advice and consent. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 8908, reprinted in DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (1976).
121. Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664,
668 (1944). "International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy
and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the
form of treaties . . . . [T]hose involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature
usually take the form of executive agreements." Sayre, The Constitutionality o1 the Trade
Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 751, 755 (1939).
122. DEP'T OF STATE, CIRCULAR No. 175, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 710 (1955); U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8809, reprinted in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 201 (1974).
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c) Whether the agreement can be given effect without the
enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress;
d) Past United States practice with respect to similar agree-
ments;
e) The preference of the Congress with respect to a particu-
lar type of agreement;
f) the degree of formality desired for an agreement;
g) The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for
prompt conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of con-
cluding a routine or short-term agreement; and
h) The general international practice with respect to similar
agreements. 1 3
There is no constitutional, statutory, or case law standard for
distinguishing between treaties and executive agreements. 2 4 There-
fore, the State Department's restrictions for the use of congres-
sional-executive agreements are the best formulation available and
should be employed in restricting the scope of executive agree-
ments.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Future courts faced with the issue presented in Rossi and
Altman should engage in a three-step analysis. The first question a
court should address is whether there was valid constitutional au-
thority to conclude such an executive agreement. 2 5 If Congress and
123. Id.
124. The district court in Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065 (D.C. Kan.), motion
for injunction pending appeal denied, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977), stated that no
constitutional standard exists for line-drawing between treaties and presidential agreements.
Id. at 1070. In holding that President Carter's decision to return various Hungarian regalia to
Hungary did not require the treaty process, the court considered the fact that the agreement
involved "no substantial ongoing commitment on the part of the United States ... and
contemplates American action of an extremely limited duration in time." Id.
125. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. It may be argued that such a
constitutional analysis is subject to the "political question doctrine" and is thus inherently
nonjusticiable. L. TRIBE, supra note 82, § 3-16, at 72-73. However, the political question
doctrine "does not deprive Courts of all power to interpret a constitutional provision: it
retains the power to determine whether a particular congressional or executive action comes
within the terms of the constitutional grant of authority." Id. §§ 3-16 at 73. The Supreme
Court, in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), held that the president's unilateral
decision to terminate a treaty was a "political" and therefore nonjusticiable question because
it involved "the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations
and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President." Id. at 1002. Prime considerations of the Court were the "absence of any constitu-
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the President are found to have constitutional power, the court
should then consider whether it was appropriate for the President
to use a nontreaty instrument rather than seek an article II trea-
ty. 126 Only after completing the first two steps of the analysis should
a court turn to available evidence of legislative intent. If clear
congressional intent indicates that the term "treaty" was used in its
constitutional article II sense, then a court should give effect to such
legislative purpose and construe the term narrowly. However, if
there is no indication of congressional intent, the Rossi decision
suggests that a court presume the term "treaty" to include congres-
sional-executive agreements.127 Because the interchangeability of
executive agreements with treaties is not desirable, 2 8 the proposed
requirement that courts look into the constitutional authority and
subject matter of the executive agreement limits this presumed
interchangeability when Congress is silent.
This limitation is in accord with congressional desire not to
exalt executive agreements to the level of treaties. 29 The Senate did
tional provision governing the termination of a treaty and the fact that different termination
procedures may be appropriate for different treaties." Id. at 1003. The analysis proposed for
future courts faced with a Rossi problem will not require examination of nonjusticiable issues.
The Constitution enumerates specific congressional powers. See supra note 63. Courts are
merely advised to determine whether in fact Congress has exceeded its specific constitutional
authority in authorizing the President to conclude an international agreement.
Courts have analyzed the constitutionality of acts of Congress by examining what powers
are vested in Congress under the Constitution. Davis v. Boston & M.R. Co., 89 F.2d 368, 372
(1st Cir. 1937). When the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether certain
provisions of an act of Congress conflicted with the Constitution, the Supreme Court expressed
its position that the constitutionality of a congressional enactment may be reviewed:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming
to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the Government has only one
duty, to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which
is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). As the Supreme Court stated in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962), "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. at 211. "The doctrine of which we treat
is one of 'political questions', not of political cases. The courts cannot reject as 'no lawsuit' a
bona fide controversy as to whether some action dominated 'political' exceeds constitutional
authority." Id. at 217.
126. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 76-108 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1977) (requiring that any international
agreement other than a treaty be transmitted to Congress no later than 60 days after the
agreement has entered into force). The popularly named Case Act, which received
unanimous Senate approval in 1971 and passed the House in 1972, represents the final version
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not consent, for example, to ratification of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties 130 because the Senate objected to the Con-
vention's general usage of the term "treaty." 131 The Senate insisted
on inserting qualifying language that "treaty" means only a treaty
enacted with the advice and consent of the Senate.132
There are no constitutional grounds to suggest that the Presi-
dent has discretion to choose between treaties and executive agree-
ments when negotiating United States international obligations. 133
The Rossi presumption, by raising executive agreements to the level
of treaties, gives the President this option. Future courts, by engag-
ing in a three-step analysis of executive agreements, can prevent
this interchangeability by scrutinizing their constitutional authority
of the Transmittal Act of 1972. S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 5787-88 (1972).
The passage of the 1972 Transmittal Act (Case Act) has been interpreted as a congressional
reaction to the President's increasing use of executive agreements and circumvention of legisla-
tive prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs. Berger, supra note 60, at 3, 35. Enthused by
the successful passage of the Case Bill, S. 596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 1904-10
(1972), Senator Samuel Ervin shortly thereafter introduced a bill that would have given
Congress the power to veto any executive agreement concluded by the President within 60 days
after its transmittal to Congress. S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 5787-88 (1972).
The Ervin bill passed the Senate in 1974, S. REP. No. 1286, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The
House, however, refused to consider the bill in that session or thereafter, thus dooming the
"congressional veto" bill to defeat. The 1974 Hearings, supra note 56, in which the wisdom of
the Ervin "congressional veto" bill was debated, however, reveals a strong senatorial desire "to
prevent the use of executive agreements to bypass the treaty-making provisions of the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 14.
Furthermore, in the early 1950's, Senator Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment
aimed at limiting presidential discretion in concluding executive agreements. The Bricker
Amendment movement is additional evidence of a senatorial desire not to exalt executive
agreements to the level of treaties. Section three of one version of the Bricker Amendment,
which proposed that "Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements
with any foreign or international organization," Revised Version of S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3, 99 CONG. REc. 6777, 6777-78 (1953), was actually passed by the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. Id. In 1954, however, a less ambitious compromise version of the Amendment
received a vote of 60 in favor and 31 against, thus lacking only one vote for the necessary two-
thirds Senate majority. S.J. Res. 181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 100 CONC. REc. 13,456 (1954). For
an extended discussion of the Bricker Amendment, see Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment,
Executive Agreements, and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1953).
130. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679.
131. For a general discussion of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States
Senate rejection of the Convention, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8809, reprinted in DIGEST
OF UNITE STATES PRACricE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 195-97 (1974).
132. Id.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
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and subject matter. This approach is most in accord with constitu-
tional mandates and the Senate's views.
CONCLUSION
In Rossi, the Supreme Court, by construing the term "treaty"
to include executive agreements barring clear congressional intent
to the contrary, essentially grants a license to the President and
Congress to utilize the congressional-executive agreement at their
discretion. In doing so, the Court failed to recognize the distinctive
character of an article II treaty.
Creating an alternative method for concluding "treaties" poses
a danger to the fundamental principles of American government.
The Constitution designates a treaty as the "supreme law of the
land." Identifying congressional-executive agreements with "trea-
ties" raises this less formal instrument to a status which it has not
been constitutionally accorded. Furthermore, the congressional-
executive agreement lacks the political and constitutional protec-
tions inherent in the treaty-making process. The Senate's character-
istic function in approving treaties is either eliminated or usurped
by a mere majority of both houses of Congress depending upon the
type of congressional-executive agreement concluded. The Execu-
tive is accorded virtual autonomy in the formation of international
agreements.
Pursuant to constitutional doctrine, Congress and the Presi-
dent may engage in joint action to conclude certain agreements in
nontreaty form. However, the interchangeable use of these two
instruments is clearly undesirable and a violation of constitutional
mandate. Thus, the use of the congressional-executive agreement
should be restricted to subject matter relating to the enumerated
powers of Congress and the President.
Future courts faced with a Rossi issue should initially scruti-
nize the constitutional basis for the congressional-executive agree-
ment in accordance with constitutional principles and congressional
wishes. Only in this way can we effectuate the Framers' intent and
avoid a subversion of the Constitution.
Julie E. Arnold
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